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The establishment clause of the first amendment' has been inter-
preted to prohibit any aid to religion.2 The free exercise clause has been
interpreted to require that religious exercise be preferentially aided.'
The coexistence of these interpretations makes conflict between the
clauses inevitable. For example, it is arguable that the establishment
clause invalidates military service exemptions granted conscientious
objectors, while the free exercise clause compels them. Since religious
opposition is the only statutory basis for a conscientious objection
claim, 4 a religious belief is clearly being preferentially aided. Failure
to grant the exemption, however, might violate free exercise.
The Supreme Court has usually decided religion cases on the basis of
one clause or the other, without explicitly recognizing the potential
conflict between them. Only Justices Brennan and Stewart have spoken
to the seeming paradox, Brennan proposing that it be resolved by a
subordination of establishment to free exercise,' Stewart proposing a
less "wooden," "sterile" interpretation of the establishment clause.0
One commentator has proposed a merger of the two clauses into a
united "neutral" principle, 7 but most have favored a subordination or
balancing approach." Part I of this Article will discuss unification,
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1. Tle first amendment to the Constitution, now applicable to the States, Cantwell v,
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S.
203 (1948), provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof...
2. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
3. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
4. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, § 60), 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 4560) (Supp. 1967),
5. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299 (1963) (concurring opinion).
6. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 US. 398, 414 (1963) (concurring opinion); Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 317 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
7. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cin. L. Rtv. 1, 96
(1961), republished as P. KURLAan, REON AND THE LAW (1962).
8. E.g., Felnman, Religion in American Public Law, 44 B.U.L. REV. 287 (1964); Glan.
nella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, 80 HARv. L. REv.
1381 (1967); Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. Cut. L. REv. 426 (1953);
Kauper, Church and State: Cooperative Separation, 60 Mien. L. REV. 1 (1961); Katper,
Prayer, Public Schools 6 the Supreme Court, 61 MicH. L. REv. 1031 (1963); Moore, rhe
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balancing and subordination as means of resolving the paradox. Part II
will seek to demonstrate that, for the most part, the dilemma results
from an unnecessarily broad reading of the establishment clause; that
the clause should be read to prohibit only aid which has as its motive or
substantial effect the imposition of religious belief or practice; and that
the Supreme Court's decisions and much of its language are consistent
with this proposed standard.
An imposition standard, by identifying the core value of the estab-
lishment clause, would clarify the issues. It would not, however, provide
automatic answers. For instance, the question whether providing text-
books to parochial schools or school children constitutes aid to a re-
ligious function would not be dispositive, since aid to a religious func-
tion is constitutional so long as no imposition results. Consequently, in
the absence of any imposition effect, provision even of religious books,
although clearly aiding a religious function, would be valid. But what-
ever its form, state aid to parochial schools or school children may free
funds for proselytization which in turn may result in imposition. This
illustration suggests the need for distinctions within an imposition
principle. We shall want to distinguish among situations where state
aid to religion does not result in any substantial imposition, where the
state itself imposes religion, and where the state aids the imposition
efforts of private institutions.
I. Proposals To Resolve the Establishment-Free Exercise Paradox
A. A No-Religious-Classification Standard
Inconsistency between the establishment and free exercise clauses
is avoided by merging them into a unified principle; each clause is
thereby deprived of any independent content and inconsistency be-
comes impossible. Professor Kurland urges that both clauses should
be construed as a unit to express the single principle that "religion
may not be used as a basis for classification for purposes of gov-
ernmental action whether that action be the conferring of rights or
privileges or the imposition of duties or obligations."0 The Supreme
Court has not adopted a no-religious-classification principle. In the
Zorach10 and Arlan's Department Store"1 cases it upheld preferential
Supreme Court and the Relationship Between the "Establishment" and "Free Exercise"
Clauses, 42 TExAs L. REv. 142 (1963); Note, The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses:
Conflict or Coordination, 48 MNN. L. REv. 929 (1964).
9. Kurland, supra note 7, at 5.
10. 343- U.S. 306 (1963).
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treatment accorded religion and its exercise, and in Sherbert v. Verner12
and In re Jenison,13 applying the free exercise clause, the Court invali-
dated state action because preferential treatment had not been ac-
corded religious exercise.14 Nonetheless, this paper will probe the
principle because, if sustainable, it would provide substantial symmetry
and certainty to, applications of the religion clauses, and because the
Supreme Court has not analyzed the principle or provided reasons for
rejecting it.
Professor Kurland characterizes a no-religious-classification standard
as "akin" to the equal protection clause. 15 It is akin to rather than
identical with equal protection, because it forbids all religious classifi-
cations instead of forbidding only all unreasonable religious classifi-
cations. A pure equal protection test would recognize the legitimacy of
values other than perfect equality and consequently would require a
determination of the reasonableness of a particular religious classifica-
tion in terms of other free exercise and establishment values. Since
accepting such additional values has resulted in an inconsistent inter-
action between the religion clauses, however, the use of a pure equal
protection test would bring us full circle back to the existing dilemma.
A no-religious-classification standard avoids the dilemma by treating the
value of perfect equality as one of transcendent significance. Para-
doxically, however, because the perfect equality concept is applied only
to religious classifications, the standard often in fact discriminates
against religious activities, and to that extent thereby subverts the
principal value purportedly promoted by the standard.1 And where
application of the standard satisfies the equality value, more significant
establishment values are often subverted.
1. The Inequality of No Religious Classification
A no-religious-classification standard prohibits government from
preferentially aiding religious activity. Aid may only be granted where
the religious activity falls within a broader secular classification. The
I
11. Arlan's Dept. Store, Inc. v. Kentucky, 371 U.S. 218 (1962) (dismissing appeal for
want of a substantial federal question).
12. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
13. 375 U.S. 14 (1963).
14. In Sherbert all of the opinions recognized the state's right to single out religion
for preferential treatment, the dissent differing only with respect to its obligation to
do so.
15. Kurland, supra note 7, at 5.
16. See id. 96.
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standard thus insists that perfect equality be accorded nonreligious
activities, with the result that a legislature may never consider a reli-
gious activity to be more worthy than a lawful nonreligious activity
having an identical need for aid or protection. Consider application of
the standard to an ordinance prohibiting raucous noises within 100 feet
of a church, enacted in order to insure tranquility for religious observ-
ance. In that form the ordinance would be a religious classification, a
religious activity having obviously been singled out for aid. Nor would
this infirmity be remedied by extending protection to, say, hospitals and
schools, if other activities requiring tranquility have not been included.
If all activities with an equal need of protection were included, then the
statute would make an activities-requiring-silence classification, which
would not conflict with the standard. But short of such total coverage
the statute does no more than list the activities to be protected; it pro-
vides no overall classification but, rather, separate church, hospital, and
school classifications, and thus it seems inescapably to make, inter alia, a
religious classification. Thus it would seem that a religious classification
could be avoided only by extending protection to all lawful activities,
regardless of their worth, which have an equal need of protection. In
order to protect religious observance it would be necessary to protect
the chess club or perhaps even the lawfully conducted poker game,
assuming that both these activities require, for their enjoyment and
efficiency, as few distractions as does a religious observance.
Moreover, the standard limits application of tie perfect equality
value to religious classification; all others are governed by conventional
equal protection criteria. A legislature may grant protection to a hos-
pital or school without extending identical aid to the chess game or, at
least so long as most secular activities with an equal need for protection
are not included, to religious observance; and this nonreligious classifi-
cation may be made solely on the basis of a judgment of worth, since
that factor, like need, is a reasonable basis for discrimination so long as
no religious classification is involved. The standard, then, only guaran-
tees that secular activities will benefit if a religious activity is aided; it
does not prohibit singling out a particular secular activity for preferen-
tial treatment. In prohibiting religious classification and simultaneously
allowing hospital, school or chess club classification, the standard,
in the name of equality, saddles religion with a disability not shared by
secular activities and is thus inconsistent with the goal of equality.
The inequality produced by a no-religious-classification standard is
apparently, but only apparently, neutralized by a special immunity
695
The Yale Law Journal
granted religion. Unlike other activities, religion may never, regardless
of rational reasons therefor, be specially obligated.Y Even if the stan-
dard did provide a special immunity, it is not clear why its price should
be disability from special aid. In fact, however, the apparent special
immunity is illusory. Application of a general regulatory or criminal
law to injurious activity engaged in as a religious exercise would not be
a religious classification but an injurious activity classification. Conse-
quently, the standard shields religion only from state action penalizing
belief or singling out religiously motivated injurious action for special
punishment. But freedom of belief is independently protected by the
free speech clause of the first amendment,18 and purposeful discrimina-
tion against religious activity is prohibited by the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. Hence, a no-religious-classification standard results in a
special disability upon religion without offering any meaningful com-
pensatory special advantage.
2. The Equality of No-Religious-Classification
A no-religious-classification standard prohibits preferential aid to
religion under all circumstances; it thereby results in inequality. At the
same time, however, the standard requires that if all secular activities
with a common characteristic receive aid, religious activities possessing
that quality shall also benefit. Thus, if all secular activities requiring
tranquility are protected, the religious observance must also be pro-
tected. Failure to extend the benefit to the religious activity ill that
situation would constitute a religious classification. To that extent the
standard promotes equality, but in various applications it does so at the
expense of a substantial establishment value.
Consider a board of education plan to include in the kindergarten
curriculum by way of practice and illustration those activities which
most children daily perform in their home lives. Such activities would
include eating, bathing, dressing and, in particular communities, pray-
ing. A no-religious-classification standard would not only permit but
also require that prayer be illustrated and practiced by all the children.
The category aided is children's predominant at-home activities, a non-
17. This special immunity, even if it had any real content, would be, in the context
of contemporary problems, quixotic. The controversies in the religion area, e.g., released
time, Bible reading in the public schools, and exemption from tax, criminal and
regulatory laws, involve special aids to religion and not special obligations. See Pfeffer,
Religion-Blind Government, 15 STAN. L. REv. 389 (1963).
18. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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religious classification. The fact that a religious activity is a pre-
dominant at-home activity and is consequently aided would, under the
standard, be irrelevant. The nonreligious class could not be parsed to
exclude the religious activity; parsing would destroy the nonreligious
character of the classification and defeat the standard's goal of equality.
The class, predominant at-home activities, could therefore not be
amended to exclude activities offensive to the religious beliefs of any
of the children. An amendment excluding activities offensive to any of
the children for any reason, religious or otherwise, would be permissible
as a nonreligious classification, but the standard, although permitting,
does not require such an exclusion. As a result of the exclusive focus
upon the equality value, the standard ignores an establishment value
more important than and inconsistent with equality. Thus, in the fore-
going hypothetical, a violation of the establishment clause should be
found in the imposition of religion by induced prayer whether prayer
were given preferred or merely equal treatment.
It might be argued that this illustration sets up something of a straw
man since, regardless of the applicability of the religion clauses, com-
pulsory prayer is unconstitutional as a violation of the freedom to be-
lieve which is, under the vague teaching of West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette," a right penumbral to freedom of speech. Even
if such a penumbral right exists, however, it includes only freedom from
coercion, not freedom from propaganda or other influence. Without
reference to the religion clauses, the State may be prohibited from
coercing belief or adherence to belief, even where the belief in question
is patriotism, but nothing in Barnette prevents it from attempting to
influence belief by propagating patriotism. This is so because although
"penumbral radiations" of the free speech clause may prohibit coercing
patriotism, that clause does not prohibit the establishment of patriotism.
Hence, in order to invalidate a noncoercive prayer program included
within a nonreligious classification, it is necessary to ascribe to the
establishment clause greater content than Professor Kurland's standard
gives it.
If the standard is modified to invalidate all direct government prose-
lytizing, whether or not pursuant to a religious classification, its result-
ing applications, although less extreme, would still contravene the es-
tablishment value. Under such a revised standard, secular aid could and
19. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See also Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 US. 479 (1965).
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indeed must be granted to religious institutions on a nonpreferential
basis where those institutions are as qualified as secular institutions to
act as instrumentalities or conduits of a nonreligious government pro-
gram. Consider a government program subsidizing the construction and
operation of privately operated recreation facilities for underprivileged
children. The program might properly exclude from participation or-
ganizations which are inexperienced in the operation of such facilities
or have insufficient resourceg to finance unsubsidized costs. But the stan-
dard requires that religious institutions, if otherwise qualified, be eli-
gible for participation. In practical operation only the established,
wealthy sects would qualify. Since recreation facilities are probably as
effective a means of proselytizing children as religious tracts,20 not only
would the subsidy, compelled by the standard, have the ultimate effect
of imposing religion, thus meeting the criterion of establishment viola-
tion proposed in this article, but it would also favor imposition of the
beliefs of the dominant, activist religions and hence effect a discrimina-
tion between religions.
In the foregoing example a no-religous-classification standard
achieves equality at the expense of the establishment value. The result-
ing equality, moreover, benefits the religious institution, not the reli-
gious child. Subsidization of recreation facilities operated by religious
institutions is not necessary to avoid discrimination between the reli-
gious and nonreligious child. There is no reason to assume that the
religious child will not take advantage of a purely secular basketball
court. But why should equality between secular and religious institu.
tions-an equality made necessary by a no-religious-classification Stan.
dard-be a constitutional imperative when discrimination between
those institutions does not result in meaningful discrimination between
their members? It is true that every organization has a point of view
which may be subtly communicated in even the most innocuous activi-
ties, and that aid to the institution may advance its propagation efforts.
The Constitution, however, does not prohibit the establishment of all
points of view, but only of religious beliefs. And while the religious
institution may rationally fear preferential, or indeed any aid to the
antireligious institution for the reason that aid in any form may pro-
mote antireligionism, it seems absurd, except with respect to all-
20. See Shaper, School Aid: A Threat to the Parish, 82 CHRISTIAN CENTUtty 39-.94;
(1965); testimony of Reverend Lowell, Executive Director of Protestants and Other Amer-
icans United For Separation of Church and State, Hearings on S. 2097. Before the
Subcomm. on -Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 748 (1966).
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encompassing activities such as education, to equate a nonreligious,
secular viewpoint with antireligion, or to characterize it as a competing,
secular religionism. Since equality between religious and secular insti-
tutions is not always necessary to prevent discrimination against religion
or its adherents, and since equal treatment may aid a church in its
proselytizing function and thus threaten an imposition of religion, the
equality goal should not be elevated into a transcendent value under-
lying the religion clauses.
3. The Proper Role of the Equality Value in Establishment Cases
There are situations where according unequal treatment to religious
and secular institutions does result in meaningful discrimination
against religion or its adherents. Denial of government aid to parochial
schools, for instance, results in three distinct injuries:
First, it obviously deprives the child attending parochial school of
educational facilities equal to those accorded public school children.
If aid to parochial schools constitutes an establishment violation, then
of course its denial, being constitutionally compelled, would be a
reasonable, albeit religious, classification and hence proper. But if, as
we shall argue,2 1 such aid presents at most, a marginal, indirect danger
of imposition, then under the standard we propose it may not be an
establishment violation at all. Whether it is or not depends on a
balancing of the denial of educational facilities resulting from dis-
crimination, together with the public interest in quality education
for all 22 against that marginal imposition danger.
Second, denial of aid to parochial schools discourages some Catholic
children from attending them, since the public schools, with their
greater resources, can provide a better education. Although the free
exercise clause does not require government to render affirmative aid
to religion,2 it may prohibit a general public aid program which fails
to make allowance for, and thus discourages, a religious choice. Thus, in
Sherbert v. Verner the Court held that although South Carolina had
no constitutional obligation to instate a welfare program providing
benefits to Seventh-day Adventists whose religious beliefs precluded
gainful employment, it was nonetheless obligated to administer the
general unemployment compensation program it had in fact adopted so
21. See pp. 736-37 infra.
22. See Hutchins, The Future of the Wall, in TUE WALL BWETEN CitunRa AND SrATE
17 (D. Oaks ed. 1963).
23. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 US. 203, 299 (1963) (concurring opinion
of Brenan, J.).
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as not to deter the faithful exercise of Seventh-day Adventism.21 By
analogy, it is arguable that although a state need not allocate any funds
for education, once it has done so it must not require any citizen to
sacrifice his religious beliefs in order to obtain an equal education.2 5
Thus, although denial of aid to parochial schools may not constitute a
clear free exercise violation, it does give rise to a substantial free exer-
cise claim -0 which, together with the Catholic's claim to equal facilities
and the state's interest in excellent education for all children, ought to
be balanced against the marginal imposition effect of aid.
Third, denial of aid to parochial schools, purportedly justified or
compelled by establishment clause considerations, may itself impair the
establishment value. The broad scope of the public school curriculum,
the intense effect that curriculum has and is intended to have upon the
value structure of all public school children,2 7 and the rigidly secular
viewpoint there emphasized, provide some support to the contention
that a secular religionism or antireligionism is being taught there, -'8
thus working a discrimination against at least all deistic religions. For
example, to avoid preferring either Catholicism or Protestantism, a
public school discussion of the Reformation would stress the political,
social and economic bases of the movement, deemphasizing the doc-
trinal religious controversy; and to the extent that the theological
dispute were considered it would be treated in an even-handed, neutral
manner, as a subject upon which reasonable men may reasonably differ.
This secular treatment unavoidably tends to belittle both Protestant
and Catholic dogma and hence may perhaps be characterized as indoc-
trinating antireligionism or secular religionism. Similarly, a civics
class in racial discrimination would invoke the equality value but
would ignore its religious source, associating the value with American-
ism or some other secular ethic. Ignoring the theological source of
the imperative-and, worse, supplying an alternative secular source-
tends to belittle, perhaps even negate, the theological. Religion is most
24. 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963).
25. But see Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947): "While we do not mean
to intimate that ai state could not provide transportation only to childrcn attending
public schools . "
26. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1947) (dissenting opinion of Rut-
ledge, J.).
27. Cf. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 216-17 (1948) (con-
curring opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
28. Drinan, The Constitutionality of Public Aid to Parochial Schools, in TilE WALl,
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 55, 68-71 (D. Oaks ed. 1963); Murray, Laut or Prepossessions,
14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 23, 39 (1949).
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necessary, and hence most believable, when it provides the sole ex-
planation for all phenomena. A system which provides answers without
reference to religion or which teaches that there are no answers makes
religion less necessary, and hence less believable.- O
The state, then, cannot be neutral in its operation of the public
schools: It must either give equal time to a religious perspective upon
so-called secular subject matter, in which case a discrimination between
religions is inevitably effected,30 or it must limit itself to secular frames
of reference, thereby belittling religion and offering itself as religion's
competitor. The decision in favor of a purely secular curriculum repre-
sents, in establishment terms, a choice of general antireligionism as an
evil lesser than the alternative of discrimination between religions. Al-
though that choice may be wise it is not neutral. Viewed in this context,
aid to parochial schools does not constitute a deviation from neutrality
but an attempt to balance the antireligionism of the public school with
the religionism of the parochial school or, from another perspective, to
give parents an effective choice between a religious and antireligious
education for their children. Another dilemma is created if aid to paro-
chial schools, in part justified by the goal of neutrality, results in an
imposition of religion perpetrated by the aided institution; aid in some
measure neutralizes the state's imposition of antireligion but promotes
the imposition efforts of the aided institution. It will be argued, how-
ever, that such aid presents only a marginal, indirect danger of imposi-
tion, qualitatively different from those threatened by a uniform, secular
educational system.31
B. Balancing and Subordination Standards
1. Balancing a Secular Purpose Against an Aid to Religion
In broad dictum Everson v. Board of Education construed the estab-
lishment clause as prohibiting all government aid to religion.32 To
avoid the stark results reached by rigid application of a no-aid standard,
various devices which limit the sweep of the principle have been
29. Cf. IV. LIPPMANN, A PREFACE TO M ROIS (1929).
30. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 281-83 (19653) (concurring opinion
of Brennan, J.).
31. See pp. 736-37 infra.
32. 33o0 U.S. 1 (1947). "The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another.... No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they
may adopt to teach or practice religion." Id. at 15-16.
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adopted or proposed. Everson itself held that aid to religion was per-
missible where it was incidental to a state purpose to implement a
secular goal and where the aid incidentally rendered religion was in-
substantial. And, similarly, the Court's opinion in Abington School
District v. Schempp33 states that an aid program incidentally advancing
religion is permissible where the purpose of the program is exclusively
secular and its effect predominantly secular.3 4
The root defect of the balancing technique employed in Everson
and stated in Abington is its failure clearly to identify and analyze the
evil resulting from an aid to or advancement of religion. Balancing is
a difficult and uncertain technique even when the identity and magni-
tude of all relevant values are clear. In the absence of an analysis of
the precise evil resulting from aid and the magnitude of that evil it is
impossible to balance intelligently a secular against a religious effect;
consequently the standard neither explains nor predicts the results it
reaches. For instance, in Everson a secular effect of the program was
greater safety for all school children. An incidental aid to religion was
the possibility that free transportation would increase attendance at
parochial schools. Assuming, for the moment, that state action which
increases parochial school attendance is an evil, it is still impossible to
weigh the safety factor against that evil unless its nature and magnitude
is understood. Suppose that reliable evidence demonstrated that free
transportation would increase parochial school enrollment by 20 per
cent and reduce accidents among parochial school children by one
tenth of one per cent. Without an understanding of the quality and
dimension of the threat presented by the parochial school or by govern.
ment aid to the parochial school, the "primary" effect cannot be identi-
fied. In this context, Mr. Justice Black's dictum that free transportation
"approaches the verge of . . power," 85 while perhaps helpful as an
arbitrary touchstone, adds nothing to one's attempt to understand the
Everson balancing technique or to apply it in a principled manner.
More substantial aid than free transportation would have a greater
33. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
34. "The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect
of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enact.
ment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That 1s
to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a
secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits re-
ligion." Id. at 222.
35. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). The Court, in its present teill,
has again upheld (sub silentio) the constitutionality of a transportation subsidy fov
parochial school children. Rhoades v. Abington School Dist., 389 U.S. 11 (1967) (disinisi'
ing appeal for want of a substantial federal question).
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effect in enhancing the attractiveness of parochial schools, but such aid
might also make a greater contribution to secular purposes.30
Similar difficulties exist in reconciling McGowan v. MarylandaT with
a balancing standard. There, the compulsory Sunday dosing law un-
doubtedly had the effect of increasing attendance at Sunday church
services, seemingly an aid to and advancement of religion. Although
the Court found that the contemporary purpose of the Maryland law,
to provide a uniform day of rest, was exclusively secular, a correct
application of the standard would have required a balancing of the
state's interest in a uniform day of rest against the incidental aid to
religion. Since the secular interest in "togetherness" would seem to be
something less than compelling,38 certainly less compelling than chil-
dren's safety, and since the supposedly incidental religious effect was
pronounced, certainly more pronounced than the relationship between
free transportation and parochial school attendance, the Court might
have been expected to hold that the state had gone beyond "the verge
of power" in requiring Sunday closing. Perhaps to avoid this problem,
Chief Justice Warren's opinion upholding the statute all but ignores
the pronounced religious effect. In fact, as will be discussed in Part II,
review of Sunday dosing laws should not call for any balancing, since
the aid thereby rendered religion does not impair any constitutional
value and hence is valid even in the absence of a greater secular good.
The no-aid rule, however, starts with the assumption that any aid to
religion is suspect and is only justified if incidental to a more important
secular purpose and effect. It does not provide a criterion whereby a
particular kind of incidental religious effect, albeit pronounced, may
be judged less dangerous than a less pronounced but different kind of
religious effect. McGowan, therefore, is either an arbitrary application
of the balancing technique as measured by the arbitrary touchstone
provided by Everson, or represents a departure from that technique.
The basic difficulty, again, is that failure to explicate the evil of aid
prevents anything but an arbitrary application of the balancing ap-
proach to the no-aid standard.
The inadequacy of a standard which balances secular benefits against
aid to religion is strikingly demonstrated by its application to state
36. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 US. 1, 50 n.42 (1947) (dissenting opinion of
Rutledge, J.).
37. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
38. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 614 (1961) (opinion of Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); id. at 616 (dissenting opinion of Stevart, J.); McGoiwan v.
Maryland, 366 US. 420, 575-76 (1961) (dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.).
703
The Yale Law Journal
action whose sole purpose and effect is to aid religion. The Everson
and Abington formulations would make any such aid program uncon-
stitutional, since there is no compensating secular purpose. But con-
sider again the ordinance forbidding raucous noises within 100 feet of
a church, or a church and other selected worthy institutions. Singling
out religious, as well as other especially worthy activities, for preferen-
tial treatment represents a state judgment that those activities should
be advanced. Protection of the tranquility of religious observance does
not further any secular value and hence could not be justified by the
Everson-Abington test. And yet, despite repeated statements of the
primary-secular-purpose-and-effect test, the Court has sustained pro-
grams whose sole purpose is to aid religion, and it would undoubtedly
sustain the raucous noise ordinance. The released time program in
Zorach39 had no other purpose, and even if Zorach is a unique case"
-a question to be examined-it is aberrant only in other respects,
since subsequent to the Abington formulation of the test, the Court
upheld per curiam a statute granting Sabbatarians exemption from a
Sunday closing law,41 an exemption whose sole purpose could only have
been aid to religion.
The deficiency of the secular balancing standard is its failure to
identify the values protected by the establishment clause; thus it in-
evitably equates qualitatively different aids to religion and results in
chaotically inconsistent applications. To be sure, identification of the
establishment values would not moot balancing in all cases. In some
situations an important secular purpose may override a marginal, in-
direct threat of imposition of religion.42 The important point is that
balancing can only follow, not replace, the first and essential task of
determining whether state action threatens an imposition of religion,
thereby creating prima facie evidence of an establishment violation,
2. Subordinating Establishment to Free Exercise Values
a. Constitutional Free Exercise
If a primary secular purpose and effect were the only permissible
justification for aid to religious exercise, the free exercise clause would
afford religion no greater protection than that accorded it under a
no-religious-classification standard. No conduct could be excused be-
39. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
40. Pfeffer, Court, Constitution and Prayer, 16 RuTEraS L. Rtv. 735, '49 (1962).
41. Arlan's Dept. Store, Inc. v. Kentucky, 371 U.S. 218 (1962) (dismissing appeal for
want of a substantial federal question).
42. See pp. 731-37 infra.
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cause of its religious character, since excusal is obviously a form of aid,
and preferential treatment accorded religious exercise serves a religious,
not a secular purpose. Therefore, to the extent that the free exercise
clause requires that religiously motivated activity receive preferential
treatment, it either places the two religion clauses in irreconcilable
conflict or compels a further modification of the no-aid principle.
Sherbert v. Verner43 involves this dilemma. South Carolina requires
as a condition for receipt of unemployment benefits that applicants be
available for suitable employment. Plaintiff, a Seventh-day Adventist,
refused to accept weekly employment which included Saturday as a
work day, and was consequently denied benefits. The Court held that
the free exercise clause requires South Carolina to exempt Seventh-day
Adventists from the Saturday availability requirement, finding no
compelling state interest subverted by that exemption. Satisfaction of
the free exercise claim by means of a Sabbatarian exemption would
seem, however, to violate the establishment clause insofar as that clause
prohibits preferential treatment of religion.44
Justice Brennan, author of the Sherbert opinion, explains his method
of resolving the dilemma in his concurring opinion in Abington:
[A]n increasingly troublesome First Amendment paradox [is] that
the logical interrelationship between the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses may produce situations where an injunction
against an apparent establishment must be withheld in order to
avoid infringement of rights of free exercise.45
Thus in Sherbert the Court apparently subordinated the establishment
to the free exercise clause. Somehow it balanced the constitutional right
to exercise Sabbatarianism against the state's constitutional disability
from aiding that exercise and concluded that the right was weightier
than the disability.4" Indeed, the language quoted from Abington indi-
43. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
44. Justice Stewart, concurring, makes the following point: "If the appellant's refusal
to work on Saturdays were based on indolence, or on a compulsive desire to watch the
Saturday television programs, no one would say that South Carolina could not hold that
she was not 'available for work' within the meaning of its statute. That being so, the
Establishment Clause as construed by this Court not only permits but affirmatively
requires South Carolina equally to deny the appellant's claim for unemployment com-
pensation when her refusal to work on Saturda)s is based upon her religious creed:' 374
US. at 414-15 (emphasis in original).
45. 374 U.S. at 247.
46. Actually, the Sherbert opinion indicates that two separate balancings were per-
formed. First, the exercise claim was balanced against South Carolina's interest in an
efficient and easily administered unemployment compensation system in order to deter-
mine whether that claim should be considered a constitutional right; then, the resultant
exercise right was balanced against the establishment disability. One wonders if the
decision would have been the same if a different order of balancing were employed. That
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cates that the Court may not have actually balanced right against
disability, but rather assumed that when collision between the two
religion clauses occurs, establishment is automatically to be subordi-
nated to exercise.
Thus, in expanding the area of permissible aid to religion to include
aid required by the free exercise clause as well as aid having a primary
secular purpose and effect, Sherbert subordinated establishment to exer-
cise. Moreover, it did so summarily, without explicit assessment of the
relative importance of competing establishment and exercise values.
But somehow the Court's cursory determination of priorities between
constitutional clauses is not shocking or even surprising. It does not
surprise because the establishment clause principle offered by Everson
and its progeny-no aid to religion-seems to be an historical ex-
crescence, properly subordinated to a contemporarily comprehensible
"vital civil right."47 The anachronistic quality of the no-aid principle,
however, does not inevitably lead to a subordination standard. If the
principle is senseless it is better discarded rather than merely subordi-
nated. So viewed, Sherbert can be interpreted as rejecting rather than
merely subordinating the no-aid principle. This interpretation avoids
the doctrinal difficulties of subordination as well as the incongruity of
two mutually inconsistent clauses in the same amendment. Moreover,
redefinition avoids the danger that the establishment clause will be
valued as something less than a vital civil right when it is used to pro-
tect against a meaningful establishment violation, i.e., an imposition
of religion.
b. Nonconstitutional Free Exercise
As already noted, the no-aid principle, even as modified by secular
balancing, does not accommodate the cases in which preferential aid
has been accorded religious exercise.48 Nor would a subordination tech-
nique, at least of the sort the Court may or may not have used in
Sherbert, explain these cases. The free exercise clause does not require
either released time49 or exemption of Sabbatarians from Sunday
is, if instead of balancing the exercise claim against the state interest and then the re-
sultant exercise right against the state's disability from satisfying it, the state's prina fade
constitutional disability plus its interest in not satisfying the religious claim were, in one
weighing, balanced against that claim.
47. Giannella, supra note 8, at 1389.
48. E.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Arlan's Dept. Store, Inc. v. Kentucky,
571 U.S. 218 (1962) (dismissing appeal for want of a substantial federal question),
49. Cf. Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1965).
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dosing laws.50 In order to reconcile Arlan's and Zorach, as well as
existing but nonlitigated practices, with the no-aid standard, a further
modification of that standard has been proposed. As further revised,
the standard would permit the prima facie evidence of a violation rep-
resented by any aid to religion to be overcome by proof that the pur-
pose of the aid was to protect free exercise, whether or not such
protection is constitutionally required.5 ' Justice Brennan endorses this
approach and urges it as a rationale justifying existing aids to religion,
like army or prison chaplains or draft exemptions for conscientious
objectors, which he assumes are not required by the free exercise
clause.52
A doctrinal difficulty with the religious purpose exception to the
no-aid principle is its retention of "no aid" as a value to be weighed
in determining the validity of aid. If no aid to religion is an establish-
ment clause value, it is doctrinally absurd to override that value in the
interest of serving its antithesis. Secular balancing, although deficient
for other reasons,5 3 at least avoids this result. A constitutional value
may often be overridden in order to serve an interest, such as children's
safety, unrelated to the value. The religious purpose exception, how-
ever, justifies infringement of a constitutional prohibition by the value
of infringing it. In other words, the religious purpose exception justi-
fies a prohibited aid to religion by the value of aiding religion. But if
the framers had thought that there was greater good in aiding religion
than in denying it aid, they would not have prohibited aid. Since all
aids to religion in some measure protect, promote or advance its exer-
cise, a prohibition upon aid must represent a judgment that govern-
ment should not protect, promote or advance exercise.
Sherbert-style subordination of an establishment violation to a free
exercise right involves this same doctrinal difficulty, although there
absurdity at least has the merit of warding off an apparent constitu-
tional stalemate. In fact, however, the doctrinal problem precipitated
by the religious purpose exception exists in the areas of both free exer-
cise rights and free exercise claims only because the exception seeks
to coexist with a no-aid principle. If that principle is discarded, no
violation, prima facie or otherwise, results simply from an aid to
50. Braunfeld v. Brown, 566 U.S. 599 (1951); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher MN&., 565
U.S. 617, 630 (1961).
51. Katz, supra note 8; Moore, supra note 8; Note, The Free Exercise and Establish-
nent Clauses: Conflict or Coordination, 48 MwnN. L. REV. 929 (1964).
52. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 295-97 (1963) (concurring opinion
of Brennan, J.).
53. See pp. 701-04 supra.
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religion. And if no imposition of religion is substituted for no aid in
defining the content of the establishment clause, then aid to religion
may be held invalid because it results in imposition but never simply
because it results in aid.
In addition to the doctrinal difficulty, the religious purpose test can-
not be intelligently applied. Like secular balancing, religious purpose
fails to identify and assess the establishment values subsumed by the
no-aid principle. The standard tells us, for instance, that released time
is in some degree bad because it aids religion. It is also in some degree
good because it protects or promotes religion. But unless we are told
the specific evils of aid and the dimensions of those evils it is impossible
to balance intelligently the good against the bad.
A possible means of balancing without identifying underlying estab-
lishment evils might be to formulate a rule which permits aid based
upon a religious purpose only when that aid "protects" free exercise.64
So phrased, the rule relies upon a distinction between a protection and
an encouragement, enhancement or promotion of religious exercise:
protection encompasses a basic minimum need, whereas the others are
luxuries or at least nonessentials. A difficulty here is that there is in
fact no necessary correlation between that which is most vital to free
exercise and that which is least damaging to establishment values. The
Jewish faith, for instance, requires a minimum of ten Jewish men as a
quorum to conduct some vital religious services. The availability of ten
Jewish men, then, is basic to the exercise of Orthodox Judaism. State
action which coerced or even induced attendance at services in order to
satisfy the "minyan" requirement would, however, be a clear imposi-
tion of religion and therefore impermissible regardless of need. A more
basic difficulty is that, as so applied, the religious purpose standard
prohibits aid which is not necessary to protect exercise but which may
be valuable to religion and causes injury to no one. This application
again results from the acceptance of no-aid as a meaningful establish-
ment value. This assumption is challenged in Part II of this article.
II. The No-Imposition-of-Religion Standard
A. Other Establishment Values
The original meaning of the establishment clause is obscure. Madison
may have believed in the complete separation of church and state, in-
54. Moore, supra note 8, at 196-97; Katz, supra note 8.
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cluding a rigid no-aid principle, and may have incorporated that belief
into his Memorial and Remonstrance.5 It is doubtful, however, that
even Madison intended the first amendment to accomplish such a
complete separation, and it is more doubtful that the Congress which
adopted and the states that ratified the amendment so intended50
Partly because its original meaning is unclear and partly because of a
modem jurisprudence which justifies departure from original, specific
intent,57 the Court in interpreting the clause has relied primarily upon
the historical and contemporary values which should structure the
relationship between religion and government.58
It is agreed that the establishment clause prohibits government from
intentionally creating an official or preferred religion;59 at this point
agreement ends. Some contend that the clause does not prohibit any-
thing except an official or preferred religion;cO others that the clause
effects a wall of separation, to be breached only by a secular or religious
value weightier than the separation principle.0 ' The latter position is
subsumed under the phrase "no aid to religion." The validity of the
"no-aid" principle is the essential controversy arising under the estab-
lishment clause, and the various attempts to create devices to soften
the impact of that principle without abandoning it are responsible for
the confusion in the area. The question then arises: why shouldn't
government aid religion? Several reasons, purportedly of constitutional
dimension, have been given.
55. Murray, supra note 7, at 30.
56. IV. M1A N WELL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 111-13 (1964); Corwin, The Supreme Court
as National School Board, 14 LAw 8: CoNmP. PRoB. 3, 13 (1949); Meiklejohn, Educa-
tional Cooperation Between Church and State, 14 LA.w & Co,'rxvip. Pno. 61, 71 (1949);
Murray, supra note 28, at 27-28. But cf. C. ANTiEAu, A. DOWNEY & E. RoEmrS, Fn-.DO.m
rRom FEDERAL EsrABLIsHmENr 29, 91, 121, 197 (1964); Calm, The Establishment of Religion
Puzzle, 86 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1274, 1279-81 (1961); Konvitz, Separation of Church and State:
The First Freedom, 14 IAw & CO .E2P. PROB. 44, 55-56 (1949).
57. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962); C. Br.AcE, THE OcCaso.Ns OF
JuSTicE 132 (1963).
58. "Whatever Jefferson or Madison would have thought of Bible reading or the
recital of the Lord's Prayer in what few public schools existed in their day, our use of
the history of their time must limit itself to broad purposes, not specific practices."
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 241 (1963) (concurring opinion of
Brennan, J.); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212-13 (1947)
(separate opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
59. See, e.g., R. DRiNAN, R.LIGION, rH CoUTs AN ! PUBuc POLICY 2"9 (1963); A. Sroszm
& L. PEFMR, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 100-03 (1964); Katz, supra note 8,
at 434; Moore, supra note 8, at 154-55.
60. Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAw & CoNny!.W. PROD.
3 (1949); Fahy, Religion, Education and the Supreme Court, 14 LA., & CoxE1.1P. PnoD.
73 (1949); Meiklejohn, supra note 56; Murray, supra note 28.
61. L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOI 727 (1967); Handy, The American Tradi-
tion of Religious Freedom: An Historical Analysis, 13 J. Puu. L. 247, 259 (1954). See also
authorities cited note 8 supra.
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1. Aid Impairs Religious Liberty
The first argument is that aid justifies regulation and regulation im-
pairs free exercise.62 The argument is neither historically nor juridi-
cally correct. Government has always aided religion, nonpreferentially
as in fire and police protection, and preferentially as in tax0 3 and
draft64 exemptions. These aids have not in fact been accompanied by
regulations which impaired free exercise. Moreover, if aid presented
a constitutionally significant danger of infringing upon free exercise,
nonpreferential as well as preferential aid should be invalid. To the
extent that aid authorizes regulation, that regulation could as easily be
affixed to one form as the other; yet even the most militant separation-
ists would allow some forms of nonpreferential aid.05 Most importantly,
aid does not justify any greater regulation of free exercise than would
be permissible in the absence of aid. Where regulation is vital to a
secular interest it may be justified by that secular interest alone;00
and where regulation is not vital, Sherbert and other unconstitutional
condition cases67 demonstrate that it may not be justified by aid. It is
true that, as a political matter, aid may prompt constitutional regula-
tion theretofore absent, but the aid has not, in that event, expended the
legislature's power-it has only resulted in its exercise. This considera-
tion is relevant to the question of whether a religious institution should
apply for aid; it is not relevant to whether the aid may be constitution-
ally goanted.
2. Aid Causes Strife
The Court68 and commentators"0 sometimes refer to avoidance of
strife as an establishment clause value from which the no-aid principle
62. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 53 (1947) (dissenting opinion of Rutledge,
J.); id. at 26-27 (dissenting opinion of Jackson, J.); Fahy, Problems of Church and State in
the United States: A Protestant View, in THE WALL BErw-TEN CHuRcH AND STATE 26, 39
(D. Oaks ed. 1963); Kurland, supra note 7, at 4.
63. See generally Kauper, The Constitutionality of Tax Exemptions for Religious Ac.
tivities, in THE WALL BarwxEN CHURCH AND STATE, 95-116 (D. Oaks ed. 1963).
64. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, § 66); 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 4560) (Supp. 1967).
65. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 60.61 (1947) (dissenting opinion of Rutledge,J.).
66. Parochial school curricula, for instance, are regulated, although no aid Is given to
parochial schools. See, e.g., N.Y. Enuc. IAw § 3204 (McKinney 1953):
Instruction Required
(1) Place of Instruction. A minor required to attend upon instruction by the pro-
visions of part one of this Article may attend at a public school or elsewhere.
The requirements of this section shall apply to such a minor irrespective of the
place of instruction.
67. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Spencer v. Randall, 857 U.S. 513 (1958).
68. Engel v. Vitale, S70 U.S. 421, 429 (1962); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
8-11 (1947); id. at 26-27 (dissenting opinion of Jackson, J.).
69. Cahn, supra note 56, at 1290; Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed
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is derived. The strife to be avoided is apparently supposed to be caused
by the antagonism of religious or irreligious groups who are not aided
or who feel that others have received a disproportionate share."0 Since
inequality in aid could, presumably, be remedied by a constitutional
requirement of equality and since it is not suggested that unavoidable
inequalities in aids to religion present peculiar constitutional dangers,
proponents of this view apparently regard the bona fides of the
grievance to be irrelevant. It is sufficient that aid does cause strife,
whether or not that strife is rational.
To state this proposition is to ridicule it. If avoidance of strife were
an independent constitutional value, no legislation could be adopted
on any subject which aroused strong and divided feelings. Nor could
a constitutional doctrine of strife avoidance be limited in application
to legislation which exacerbates religious differences on the ground that
those differences are more upsetting than any others. Patently, racial
differences are today a far greater cause of strife than differences in
religious belief. Would, then, the possibility of exacerbated racial
controversy in and of itself invalidate open housing legislation?
Moreover, prohibiting aid to religion does not avoid strife, it merely
alters its source. Aid to parochial schools may exacerbate strife by an-
tagonizing Protestants who for the most part would not derive advan-
tages from such an aid program. Failure to aid, however, antagonizes
Catholics who pay taxes to support public school education and pay
separately to educate their own children at parochial schools. Even if
strife avoidance were an independent constitutional value, it would
support a no-aid standard only if religious groups generally agreed to
a no-aid principle.7' Since there is no such agreement,72 both aid and
no aid cause strife. Consequently, one must look elsewhere for the
source of the no-aid principle.
Constitutional Standard, 47 MINN. L. R"v. 329, 331 n.8 (1963); Fahy, Problems of Church
and State in the United States: A Protestant View, in THE WALL BtMrwr. CIURCH AND
STATE 26, 38 (D. Oaks ed. 1963); Gordon, The Unconstitutionality of Public Aid to Paro.
chial Schools, in id. 73, 77-78.
70. "Public money devoted to payment of religious costs, educational or other, brings
the quest for more. It brings too the struggle of sect agamst sect for the larger share or
for any. Here one by numbers alone will benefit most, there another." E erson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 53 (1947) (dissenting opinion of Rutledge. J.).
71. Indeed, even if there were such agreement, failure to aid parochial schools would
cause strife since many Catholics believe that in supporting the public schools the) are
subsidizing an alien religious or irreligious dogma. See authorities cited note 27 supra.
72. See Kurland, The School Prayer Cases, in TnE WALL B nYF._v Cuiur c AND STATE
142-46 (D. Oaks ed. 1963) (reactions of religious leaders to the Supreme Court's decision
in the Prayer Cases).
711
The Yale Law Journal
3. Aid Costs Money
Most governmental aids to religion involve an expense which is
borne in part by the nonbeliever and the other-believer, either in-
directly through their tax bill, as in a subsidy to religion, or directly
as in exemption of Sabbatarians from Sunday closing laws.70 The
supposed inequity of this burden often is stated as the reason for the no-
aid principle. Justice Black, for instance, writes for the Court in Ever-
son, "No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions ... ,,4 and he cites the Virginia Bill
For Religious Liberty for the proposition "'that to compel a man to
furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which
he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical.' "7
Emphasis upon pocketbook injury suffered by the nonbeliever or
other-believer suggests that the value being invoked is that public
moneys cannot be used to support private purposes. Religion, it is
assumed, is exclusively a private affair. Ergo, the government may not
use public funds to aid religion.70 The minor premise of this syllogism,
however, is false. 7 Religion has significance to an individual in areas
which may fairly be called private; it also has significance in areas which
are of vital public concern. Successful government in the United States
depends upon popular participation in the affairs of government and
73. The Sabbatarian exemption may cause financial injury to all those who, not
being Sabbatarians, are forced to close on Sunday, thereby losing trade to their Sabba.
tarian competitors.
74. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). See also Abington School Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299-300 (1963) (concurring opinion of Douglas, J.); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 444 (1962) (concurring opinion of Douglas, J.); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1946) (dissenting opinion of Rutledge, J.).
75. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947). Note, however, that the Virginia
Bill emphasizes "propagation," not aid to exercise, as that which it is tyrannical to be
compelled to contribute. This language seems more oriented to the fear of imposition
than to a pocketbook interest.
76. Even if it were assumed that religion is exclusively a private affair, a construction
of the establishment clause as limited to the protection of the pocketbook interests of non.
believers and other-believers would not invalidate aid to parochial schools. Any such aid
is nominally for a secular use, the allegation of religious use made by opponents of such
aid programs being based upon the premise of inevitable partial diversion of funds to a
religious use or the view that a parochial school cannot or will not separate secular from
religious subject matter. Since such aid programs will, however, inevitably enhance
secular education in the parochial schools, even if some of the moneys will be diverted
to an exclusively religious use and even if there is an inextricable intermixture of religious
and secular subject matter, the argument of the opponents resolves to the proposition
that public moneys cannot be expended inefficiently. But cannot a legislature rationally
conclude that an investment in a public purpose (secular education in the parochial
schools) is worthwhile even if some of the moneys inevitably and irremediably will be
used to advance a private but otherwise innocuous use? See notes 80 & 84 infra.
77. Father Murray observes that the intuitive conclusion that religion is exclusively
a private affair may well be used upon deistic belief which so defines man's relationship
with God. To read that belief into the establishment clause, however, is to establish
deism. Murray, supra note 28, at 29.
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in a thousand other affairs which are private only because individual
and associational participation have made government intervention
unnecessary. Some of this vitally necessary participation results from
unalloyed self-interest (vote your pocketbook). Much of it, however,
requires a sense of the rightness and wrongness of things-a sense in-
dispensable to involvement where immediate self-interest is absent. One
need not accept Kant's argument that God exists because true morality
cannot exist without God in order to recognize that religion is impor-
tant if not indispensable to a moral sense, that a moral sense is impor-
tant to involvement, and that involvement is necessary to democracy.78
Alexander Meiklejohn makes the point well:
[T]hinking and feeling, though different from one another, are
dependent on each other. What we feel and do about any object
determines, and is determined by, what we know and believe
about it. Any man or society whose feelings are going in one direc-
tion while his ideas are going in another is, in so far, lacking in
sanity and heading for breakdown.... For some 40 or 50 or 60
per cent of our people, ... religious belief is ... the necessary and
sufficient source from which our democratic institutions derive
their moral validity.79
Although religion promotes involvement and therefore serves a
public purpose,80 there may still be reasons for prohibiting government
from aiding it. But any such reasons would have nothing to do with
public purpose; indeed if they exist, they do so despite rather than
because of the relationship between religion and public purpose. And
the Supreme Court, when it has directly addressed itself to this matter,
has recognized the public aspect of religion rather than simply stating
the major premise and conclusion of a defective syllogism. In Zorach
the Court said, "We are a religious people whose institutions pre-
suppose a Supreme Being"; 8' and in Engel v. Vitale, 2 "The history of
man is inseparable from the history of religion." Even Justice Rutledge
recognized that religion promotes the public welfare; his vehement
78. See generally W. LippmANN, supra note 29.
79. Meiklejohn, supra note 56, at 62.
80. The aid-costs-money basis for the no-aid principle relies entirely upon the public
purpose doctrine. To satisfy the requirements of that doctrine as it is elsewhere applied
it is not necessary to demonstrate conclusively a relationship between religion and public
purpose but only to show that a legislature could reasonably believe that such a relation-
ship exists. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Railway Express Agency v. New York,
336 U.s. 106 (1949).
81. 343 U.S. at 313.
82. 370 U.S. at 434.
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objection to aid was based upon what he conceived to be its indepen-
dent dangers.83
In any event, does the public purpose doctrine necessarily require a
benefit to the state? Why may not satisfaction of a "private" need or
desire be a public purpose, when that need or desire will be frustrated
without government aid and when the public considers it to be worthy
(as it arguably considers religion)? Before the government can supply
food stamps to starving Americans, must it first be shown that the
economy will thereby benefit or that crime will be avoided or con-
tagious disease prevented? Or isn't giving food to hungry people a
sufficient public purpose?
Once it is recognized that aid to religion is aid for a public purpose,
however that phrase is defined, the "why should I pay to support an-
other's religious belief" argument loses all constitutional force. A tax-
payer's lack of sympathy with the public use to which his funds are
being applied is constitutionally irrelevant. The allocation of resources
among competing claims, each serving a public purpose, is essentially
a political question, ultimately to be determined by the electoral
process, not the Constitution. 4 Constitutional determination requires
injury to a constitutional right, and the aid-costs-money basis for the
no-aid principle, except as it seeks to rely upon the public purpose
doctrine, is not based upon any such injury.8 5
Moreover, despite dicta disapproving of the expenditure of public
money for religious use, the Court has not invalidated any aid to reli-
gion on that basis. The issue was precipitated in almost crystalline form
in Arlan's Department Store v. Kentucky. 6 There the Court dismissed
83. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 52 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
84. Williams v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (and cases cited therein).
85. If the interest guarded by the establishment clause is not that of preventing the
use of the nonbelievers' or other-believers' money for a religious purpose, but, as we shall
show, that of protecting against an imposition of religion, then a taxpayer's injury should
always be an insufficient basis for standing to assert an establishment violation, A tax.
payer, in his capacity as a taxpayer, would always be asserting injury to a nonconstitu.
tional interest or, at best, injury to another's constitutional interest. Theoretically, any
case, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), which bases standing exclusively
on taxpayer status implies, to that extent, that the establishment clause protects a
financial interest. Standing doctrine, however, has certainly not been consistently ap
plied, and no insight into the merits can be gained from a decision which assumes or
explicitly recognizes a party's standing. Compare Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (19-13)
with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965) and Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S.
249 (1953). See also A. BicK.L, supra note 57, at 120-27; Lewis, Constitutional Rights and
the Misuse of 'Standing,' 14 STAN. L. Rav. 433 (1962). If, however, standing has any prin-
cipled content, it should more easily be found where a party suffers injury to a religious
interest than where the only injury is financial. See Abington School Dist. v. Schenpp,
374 U.S. 203, 224 n.9 (1963); Black, Religion, 'Standing,' and the Supreme Court's Role,
13 J. PUB. L. 459 (1964). See also Brown, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?-The School-
Prayer Cases, 1963 SUPEIE CouRT Ray. 1.
86. 371 U.S. 218 (1962).
714
Vol. 77: 692, 1968
No Imposition of Religion
for want of a substantial federal question an appeal from a state court
decision upholding legislation exempting Sabbatarians from the Sun-
day dosing laws. The sole purpose of the exemption was to aid Sab-
batarianism and it caused non-Sabbatarian store owners far more finan-
cial injury than any individual taxpayer indirectly suffers through a
grant of public funds for a religious purpose.87 Although the Court
may have weighed an establishment clause prohibition against compel-
ling anyone to support another's religion against the Sabbatarians' free
exercise claim and arbitrarily concluded that the free exercise claim
was weightier,88 the manner of disposition may indicate that the Court
found no constitutional basis for the citizen's interest in not support-
ing another's religion.
4. Aid Impairs Secular Unity
Every level of government has an interest in the unity of its citizens.
A shared system of values minimizes dissension and facilitates joint
action toward a common goal. The best means of achieving unity is
to reserve for government operation those institutions which exert the
greatest influence on shaping the values of the population. Perhaps the
most important of all such institutions is the educational system. Justice
Frankfurter, concurring in Illinois ex Tel. McCollum v. Board of
Education,9 describes the public school as "[d]esigned to serve as per-
haps the most powerful agency for promoting cohesion among a
heterogeneous democratic people" and as "a symbol of our secular
unity."90
Not all aids to religion meaningfully affect secular unity. Some-like
exempting Mrs. Sherbert from unemployment compensation require-
ments9 -- are not relevant to the unity goal. Others-like exempting
conscientious objectors from military service and providing army
chaplains-may conceivably weaken the unifying tendencies of a
secular institution. But the essential purposes of the military as an
institution do not include the promotion of unity. Therefore, even
complete acceptance of secular unity as a constitutional value need not
yield a rigid no-aid standard. Some aids to religion, however, contra-
vene the unity value by weakening secular institutions which signifi-
cantly promote that value. Aid to parochial schools, for instance, will
87. See note 73 supra.
88. See pp. 706-09 supra.
89. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
90. id. at 216-17.
91. See pp. 705-06 supra.
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decrease the enrollment of Catholic children in the public schools and
thus impair the unifying tendencies of that institution. And released
time, while probably having the effect of increasing attendance of
Catholic children at public schools and thus strengthening the institu-
tion, impairs its unifying effect.
On what basis, however, is it assumed that secular unity is a constitu-
tional requirement? The state, to be sure, has a corporate interest in
unity, but in no other context is a state corporate interest converted
into a constitutional requirement. The state has an interest in an edu-
cated population. Is compulsory education, then, a constitutional
mandate; and is a government program to employ school drop-outs,
then, unconstitutional? The Constitution defines permissible govern-
mental interests; it does not require that permissible interests be effec-
tuated nor prohibit a legislature from impairing one in order to serve
another permissible interest. The function of choosing between per-
missible but inconsistent interests, at least in every other context, is
assigned to the legislature and ultimately, through the political process,
to the people.
Since the state's interest in secular unity does not give rise to a
constitutional prohibition against aid, the relationship between any
such prohibition and the unity value must be based upon an individual
constitutional right. But no such right is apparent. Aid to parochial
schools, released time and prayer in the schools all, to one extent or
another, impair unity, either by facilitating the segregation of children
according to their religious or irreligious beliefs or by recognizing
religious differences where there is no segregation. This characteriza-
tion of the situation invites analogy to Brown v. Board of Education,02
but here, unlike Brown, there is no state policy to segregate; that result
is caused entirely by individual choice. A more appropriate analogy-
assuming that religious and racial segregation are analogous--is Griffin
v. County School BoardY3 There, the Court invalidated a plan whereby
the state subsidized attendance at racially segregated private schools.
It did so, however, because of its conclusion that the purpose of the
plan was to implement the state's policy of maintaining segregated
schools and, significantly, the decree enjoined the subsidy only so long
as the county public schools were closed. 4 It cannot be seriously con-
tended that in aiding parochial schools any state has been or would
92. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
93. 877 U.S. 218 (1964).
94. Id. at 231, 233.
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be implementing a state policy to segregate according to religion, rather
than respecting private individual choice and implementing a state
policy of quality education for all children.
Even if the Constitution were to be interpreted to prohibit all aid
which has the effect of impairing racial unity, regardless of state
policy,9 5 the injury which would prompt such an interpretation is
qualitatively different from any injury caused by the impairment of
secular unity. In Brown, the evil of segregation was not that it impaired
any abstract associational claim. Rather it was the psychological injury
caused by a state policy of segregation carrying an implicit judgment of
inferiority, coupled with the denial of equal educational benefits, which
the Court found to be an inevitable result of racial school segregation.
Regardless of the correctness of the Court's psychological and educa-
tional conclusions in Brown, they have no bearing on any injury caused
by impairment of secular unity. That value by itself protects only the
abstract associational claim of togetherness and a claim to have the
concept of oneness inculcated through the public school curriculum.
Aid to parochial schools, for instance, may result in depriving Protes-
tant children of association with Catholic children, but the Protestant
child's loss in no way resembles the injury which the Court in Brown
found that segregation works on the Negro. That being the case, why
is the Protestant's claim to association with the Catholic to be preferred
to the Catholic's claim to disassociation? 0 And why does the Protestant
have a constitutional right to have the Catholic exposed to the teaching
of oneness? 97 Moreover, if such an associational right exists, why does it
exist only with respect to religious differences? The economically de-
prived student would seem to have a greater associational interest in
attending school with the wealthy student than a Protestant does with
a Catholic. Yet neither the establishment clause nor any other provision
in the Constitution prohibits aid to nonsectarian private schools.0s
95. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). The Reitman decision is dillicult to
understand. Giving it the broadest reasonable reading, however, it would only stand for
the proposition that a state may not act for the purpose of encouraging or authorizing
private discrimination. Even accepting this very broad reading, state action, otherwise
motivated, which incidentally facilitated private discrimination would be ,ad.
96. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HMnV. L. RP'.
1, 34 (1959).
97. Such a right might exist if the establishment clause represents a constitutionaljudgment that religion is antithetical to the constitutional rights of nonbelievers and
other-believers. This possibility is discussed at pp. 721-24 mira.
98. See Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1967, at
1, col. 5 (report that New York State Attorney General Lefkowitz All nle that state
professorial endowment grants to Fordham University-a Catholic institution-are Niola-
tive of the New York State Constitution whereas such grants to other private universities
are valid).
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Thus considered, neither the claim to association nor that to dis-
association should be constitutionally preferred, and unless we can find
a more persuasive establishment value, the state should be free to decide
between these antithetical associational values according to which has
the greater political support or which best coincides with a corporate
state interest. One such interest is unity, but another is excellence in
education for all. Yet another basis for a political decision is the
religious claim of those wishing disassociation. The Court held in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters99 that compulsory public school education
was unconstitutional. This holding does not compel aid to parochial
schools, although as a practical matter many Catholics will "have" to
attend public schools if parochial schools are not aided,100 but the free
exercise claim,0,1 like the correlative establishment claim precipitated
by attendance at "secular" public schools,10 2 may properly be con-
sidered by a legislature in arriving at its determination.
That secular unity is not and should not be an establishment clause
value is finally and perhaps best shown by the results it would autho-
rize. To obtain maximum unity between the Catholic and non-Catholic
populations the state would induce (though it cannot compel) Catholics
to desert the parochial schools. So long as Catholic education funds
hold out, the only inducement with any chance of success would be a
system of voluntary religious training in the public schools. Offering
religion in the public schools would deprive the parochial school of at
least some of the advantages it now offers the religious Catholic, and
the more religion offered, the greater the inducement. This solution
might make a greater contribution to togetherness and the inculcation
of oneness than public schools without religious training. To be sure,
religion in the public schools would dilute the maximum togetherness
now available to the children who attend them, but that dilution might
well be more than made up for by exposing a larger percentage of the
Catholic school community to much more togetherness and some more
oneness than they now receive. Somehow this solution to the secular
unity problem is not appealing. But, if the foregoing analysis is correct,
its lack of appeal cannot be explained by its failure to promote secular
unity. Rather, it demonstrates that secular unity is not the establish-
ment value we are seeking.
99. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
100. See note 147 infra.
101. See also pp. 699-700 supra.
102. See pp. 700-01 supra.
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5. Aid Impairs Equality Among Religions and Between Religion and
Irreligion
Whatever additional content the establishment clause may have, it
clearly prohibits discrimination among religions and betAeen religion
and irreligion. 03 To the extent, however, that the agreed principle of
no preference is analogous to the equal protection clause, it does not
yield a derivative principle of no aid. It merely requires that if aid is
granted, the aided category must include all religions and irreligions.
So read, the establishment clause requires that aid be granted atheists
and agnostics if Protestants and Catholics are aided. It does not, how-
ever, require as a condition of aid to religion that institutions or ac-
tivities which have nothing to do with either religion or irreligion also
be aided. A standard which allows aid so long as it is equal necessitates
a constitutional definition of "religion" and "irreligion." The defini-
tional problem is troublesome, 04 but that difficulty does not justify
rejection of an equal-aid standard since the same difficulty inheres in a
no-aid standard. "Religion" must be defined whether the standard be
no aid or equal aid.
To substitute an equal-aid for a no-aid principle would not result in
identical, and perhaps not even in equal, benefits. Legislators, judges
and administrators may, improperly, define religion and irreligion
according to their own beliefs, thus discriminating against irreligion
and the minority, odd-ball sect. More importantly, identical benefits
are often impossible to achieve. To allow each schoolchild in turn to
recite a prayer or antireligious statement of his choosing, for instance,
while satisfying the value of equal opportunity, would most benefit
the majority belief since that belief would realize the most prayer time.
Or, to grant financial aid to all religious and irreligious institutions
will provide a lesser benefit to the minority sect which may not have
the members, finances, organization, or even the desire to utilize the
grant. The equality principle, however, does not demand identical
benefit. Disparity in resultant benefits is an unavoidable characteristic
of any aid program, and the equality principle, as conventionally under-
stood, requires only that all members of the same class (i.e., all religions
and irreligions) receive the same opportunities. Indeed, the conven-
tional equality value demands that a religion with a large number of
103. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216-17 (1953); Torcaso v. Watkins,
367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1951); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 US. 1, 15-16 (1946).
104. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Giarnella, supra note 8, at
1423-31.
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adherents receive a greater share of a government program intended to
aid individuals than a minor sect. It is thus apparent that if the estab-
lishment clause did no more than incorporate a conventional equal
protection value, it would not invalidate equitably allocated aid which
produced disparities in benefit.
B. The No-Imposition Value
The no-preference principle incorporated within the establishment
clause is not, however, merely an application of the conventional
equality value. It seeks to prevent inequality not only as an inde-
pendent, ultimate goal, but as a protection against a possible conse-
quence of inequality: an imposition of religion. Failure to divide an
aid-to-religion pie into identical segments is not unconstitutional be.
cause it results in A eating more than B; that result may be fair and
practicable. The danger lies in the fact that A may, and historically has,
thrown its pie at B, or more accurately, at B's child. If only the equality
value were involved, B, not wishing pie or not being able to digest it,
should not begrudge A his piece so long as B had the opportunity of
participating. But in a pie-throwing contest, keeping ammunition from
your opponent is as important as having some yourself.
There are two aspects of the imposition danger-one institutional,
the other individual. In both cases, the ultimate fear is that govern-
ment aid will, directly or indirectly, be used to influence choice of
religion, not merely to enhance another's exercise. And it is this fear
which causes strife and which makes use of the nonbeliever's or other-
believer's taxes so galling. To the individual, the essential danger is
that the family's right to determine the religious beliefs of its members,
especially its children, will be undermined, either directly by govern-
ment imposition of religion or indirectly by government aid to the
imposition efforts of religious institutions. Regarding religious choice
as exclusively a family affair,10 5 the no-imposition value, in its indi-
vidual aspect, resolves into a standard prohibiting all aid which presents
a substantial danger of imposition of religion.10 To the religious or
irreligious institution, the essential danger is that government aid will,
105. Although the no-imposition value prohibits government from influencing reli-
gious choice, to that extent making religion a private affair, government has a legitimate
interest in implementing and encouraging exercise of that private choice, and to that
extent, aid to religion serves a public purpose. See pp. 712-13 supra.
106. The universality and intensity of the belief that religious choice should be cx-
clusively determined by the family is illustrated by an Israeli law forbidding the con-
version of a minor without the simultaneous conversion of the parents. See Gramiont,
Jerusalem: Experiment in Coexistence, N.Y. Times, July 30, 1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 14, 20.
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by intention or othenvise, favor the proselytizing efforts of a competi-
tor. From the institutional point of view, the battle for adherents could,
theoretically, be staged under a no-aid standard or under a standard of
identical aid. But since it is impossible to aid all proselytization iden-
tically, the institutional interest also resolves into a standard which
prohibits all aid presenting a substantial imposition danger.
Almost every Supreme Court Justice who has written an opinion in-
volving the establishment clause has identified no imposition as an
establishment value. For instance, Justice Black in McCollum charac-
terizes the violation as aid which enables "religious groups to spread
their faith" in violation of the constitutional prohibition upon aid to
"the dissemination of ... doctrines."' 07 And in Engel he says, "When
the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed be-
hind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon
religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved
religion is plain."'-08 Justice Frankfurter, concurring in McCollum,
identifies the violation as government participation in a program of
"religious instruction in a faith which is not that of their [the chil-
dren's] parents,"'-09 and Justice Stewart, dissenting in Abinglon, states
that the violation is "government support of proselytizing activities of
religious sects by throwing the weight of secular authority behind the
dissemination of religious tenets. ' 110 The important question, then, is
not whether no imposition is an establishment value, but whether the
establishment clause contains any other value' and, if not, whether
the no-imposition value requires a no-aid standard.
As already discussed, it has been asserted that aid to religion imperils
the religious liberty of members of the aided institution. Although this
assertion is not persuasive, more substantial questions are raised by the
related claim that aid imperils the liberties of nonbelievers and other-
believers." - That claim relies upon the historical fact that the ascen-
dancy of a religious group has often been associated with the denial of
civil liberties to nonbelievers and other-believers. Nor is that associa-
107. 333 U.S. at 210-11.
108. 370 U.S. at 431.
109. 333 U.S. at 227-28.
110. 374 U.S. at 314. See also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 806, 311 (1963) (Justic
Douglas speaking for the Court); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.. 333 U.S.
203, 249 (1948) (dissenting opinion of Reed, J.); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I.
26 (1947) (dissenting opinion of Jackson, J.); Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A
Proposed Constitutional Standard, 47 MINN. L. REv. 329 (1963).
111. See pp. 709-19 supra.
112. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (concurring opinion
of Goldberg, J.); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 420, 431 (1962; Everson v. Board of Educ., 30
U.S. 1, 53-54 (1947) (dissenting opinion of Rutledge, J.); Katz, supra note 8, at 436.
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tion of only historical validity. Despite the ecumenical movement, it
remains true that the supposedly divine source of most religious dogma
gives each dogma a claim to exclusive validity which is basically incon-
sistent with toleration of other beliefs.1 3 And the association is not
weakened when a prominent Catholic spokesman asserts that it is the
state's duty to promote the true religion, that a Catholic state could not
logically permit other groups to engage in "general propaganda," and
that constitutional impediments to the view are not insurmountable
since "[C]onstitutions can be changed, and non-Catholic sects may de-
cline to such a point that the political proscription of them may become
feasible and expedient."' 1 4
The threat to civil liberties presented by a dominant religious group
was clearly a substantial consideration in the adoption of the establish-
ment clause and it fully supports the accepted view that the clause pro-
hibits establishing or preferring a religion. The issue, however, is not
exclusive or preferential aid, but any aid. But if equal aid results in
unequal benefits and if equal benefits cannot in practice be realized
then any aid will increase the power of some churches more than
others, and often the church that benefits most is the one which is
already closest to dominance. It seems to follow that the best means of
avoiding the dangers of dominance is to adopt a no-aid rather than an
equal-aid standard. In this context, the real danger of aid to Catholic
parochial schools seems to be not that it impairs unity, considered as a
state interest, or defeats the Protestant's associational claim, but that
it increases the power of the Catholic church, both in absolute terms
and in relation to the power of other churches; it is not the Catholic
child's absence from a public school that raises constitutional dangers;
it is his presence at a parochial school.
The trouble with this position is that it proves too much. The free
exercise clause of the first amendment makes religion a constitutional
value. Hence, the position must conceive of religion simultaneously as
a value and as a threat, the separation principle which includes a no.
aid doctrine being necessary to maintain equilibrium between them.
But what precisely is this supposed equilibrium? Assume that the now
only incipient dangers of religion come closer to fruition as a result
of the emergence of a dominant and militant religious group in the
113. Cavert, A Response, in THE DOCuMENTS OF VATICAN II, at 369 (W. Abbott ed.
1966).
114. Ryan, Comments on the "Christian Constitution of States," in J. RYAN & M.
MILLA.R, THE STATE AND THE CHURCH 26, 37-39 (1922), discussed in Katz, supra note 8, at
436.
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United States. In these circumstances, would retention of equilibrium
require regulation of the threat? The answer is unquestionably that
the free exercise clause forbids any state action against the dominant
religious group, at least until first amendment rights of nonbelievers
are actually violated. But if equipoise does not require or allow regula-
tion when the threat is imminent, why does equipoise forbid aid at a
time when the threat is wholly inchoate? This is not to deny that
religion constitutes an incipient danger to the rights of other-believers
or that a no-aid principle would do more to mitigate that danger than
a principle of equal aid, just as a constitutional prohibition upon
religion would be more effective than either. It is to say, however, that
in the light of the private and public value of religion, it is better to
partially neutralize its incipient dangers by an equal-aid standard than
to neutralize them more effectively by a no-aid standard.
The foregoing paragraph seeks to demonstrate that if, in appraising
the value of religion against its incipient dangers, a choice had to be
made between unrefined no-aid and equal-aid standards, the latter
would be preferable. In fact, however, no such choice need be made.
Authoritarianism and prejudice correlate with, and may be caused by,
religious belief," 5 and religion may consequently constitute a threat
to the rights of other believers. Any aid-equal or unequal-which
has the effect of inducing religious belief may therefore increase the
total threat. But any such religion-inducing aid offends the value of
exclusive parental choice of religion and is consequently invalid under
a no-imposition standard. Conversely, aid which does not have the
effect of inducing religious belief, but merely accommodates or im-
plements an independent religious choice, does not increase the danger
of religion and, since it does not offend the value of parental choice,
does not violate the no-imposition standard. Belief in Seventh-day
Adventism may pose a threat to the nonbeliever, but the threat only
correlates with the growth of that religion. It is not accentuated by aid
which merely facilitates its exercise. Mrs. Sherbert's belief in Seventh-
day Adventism may have made her a greater threat to the rights of
non-Adventists than she would otherwise have been; but exempting
her from unemployment compensation requirements did not increase
that threat. Therefore, regardless of its source and whether coincidental
or not, a no-imposition standard seems to serve the value of affording
maximum protection to nonbelievers and other-believers from aid
which increases the danger of religion; and it appears unnecessary to
115. Mf. ARGYLE, RELIGIOUS BEHLAIOR 83-85, 87-92 (1958). and studies cited therein.
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resolve definitively the question of whether the establishment clause
guarantees nonbelievers and other-believers any greater protection
from the incipient dangers of religion than that accorded by an equal-
aid standard.
A no-imposition standard, then, is consistent with the value of
protecting nonbelievers and other-believers from the incipient dangers
of religion in situations where government action induces religious
belief and in situations where government action implements an inde-
pendent religious choice without inducing belief. A much more diffl-
cult application is the situation where government action, while not
inducing belief, has the effect of broadening belief or increasing its
intensity. Aid to parochial schools, for instance, will not ordinarily110
have the effect of inducing the adoption of Catholicism; increased
parochial school attendance will result, but that follows from im-
plementation of a Catholic family's independent desire to have the
child receive religious instruction, not from state action creating that
desire. Notwithstanding, a parochial school education, made more
attractive by the aid, will or may intensify the child's commitment to
Catholicism." 7 In determining whether that intensification effect
might render the aid an establishment violation, we need not consider
the value of exclusive parental choice. Since the family has presumably
chosen parochial school education for the very purpose of intensifying
the child's religious commitment, its rights have not been impaired.
Nor need we consider the value of state neutrality in the institutional
struggle for adherents. That value is primarily concerned with state
action which encourages or facilitates poaching, not with action which
tends to make poaching more difficult. But, if religion is adverse to the
rights of other believers, does not aid which has the effect of intensify-
ing belief increase the danger, and to that extent, is not the value of
protecting other believers from the dangers of religion given something
less than maximum protection by a no-imposition standard? Justice
Douglas may have the dangers of religion in mind when he warns that
the "vice" of aid is that it facilitates "a church's efforts to gain and keep
adherents."" 8
116. It might where the aid resulted in the parochial school's having better educational
facilities than the local public school or where it resulted in facilities as good as those
in the local public school and thereby attracted non-Catholic whites who wished to
avoid a predominant Negro population in the public school. In either of these situations,
the aid would constitute an imposition of religion.
117. See M. ARGYLF, supra note 115, at 43.
118. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 228 (1963) (concurring opinion)
(emphasis added).
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If religion is a threat to the other-believer, the believer's apostasy
might be to his advantage. 110 Even on that assumption, however, the
practical alternatives are not commitment versus apostasy but nominal
versus devout belief. If there were no parochial schools the total
Catholic population would not be significantly reduced. The vast
majority of people continue, at least nominally, in the religion they
were born to. And the occasional instance of apostasy to which a
denial of aid might contribute has no constitutional relevance because
the threat to the other believer comes from the totality of a religion's
membership, not from any particular believer or handful of believers.
The question, then, is whether a devout believer is more dangerous
than a nominal believer. There is no certain means of resolving this
question, but the evidence points to a negative answer. First, those
aspects of a religion's dogma which are most threatening to the rights
of other believers are also those most easily learned. It is not necessary
to go to parochial school to learn that the Jews killed Christ. On the
contrary, a parochial school education ideally will tend to illuminate
Catholic doctrine and thus eliminate intolerances absorbed through
casual, uninformed contact. Second, there is substantial authority for
the proposition that religious aggression arises not from religious
dogma or teaching, but from psychological factors unrelated to re-
ligion. To be sure, religion directs that aggression towards the other-
believer, but a nominal belief may channel aggression equally as well
as devout conviction.2 0 Third, empirical evidence indicates that the
devout believer (defined, in part, by frequency of church attendance
which in turn correlates with early exposure to religious training) is
less authoritarian and less prejudiced than the casual, nominal be-
liever. Argyle concludes that although the atheist is less prejudiced and
authoritarian than the Catholic, the devout Catholic is less so than his
nominal co-religionist.' 2 '
But perhaps devout belief and nominal belief are not the only
alternatives to be considered. Even if devout belief is no more-and
perhaps less-dangerous than nominal belief, and even if the possibility
119. Argyle concludes that atheists and agnostics are least prejudiced and author-
itarian-and that Catholics are most. M. ARGYLE, supra note 115. In this connection,
however, the important statistic would be a comparison of prejudice and authoritarianism
as between Catholics, and agnostics and atheists who formerly were Catholic. No such
statistic is available.
120. L. Brizowrrz, AGGRESSION: A SoctaLt PSYCHtOLOGiCAL ANAL'sis 13264 (1962). Sec
generally T. AxoRNo, E. FRAEE.t-BRuNsWicE, D. I.EviNso.' & R. S.'roRD, THE AUrrloa-
rrAmAN PERSONALITY 973 (1950); A. Buss, THE PSYCHOLOGY or AGGREsSIoN 245-59 (1951).
121. M. ARGYLE, supra note 115, at 83-85, 89, 93.
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of outright apostasy is not a significant or benign factor, there still
remains the potential for diluting obnoxious religious belief through
the cleansing medium of secular public education. In this context, aid
to parochial schools would be invalid not because it intensifies belief
but because it deprives the state of the opportunity to substitute
democratic, scientific and other secular values for obnoxious religious
belief.122 This analysis provides an explanation for the Catholic
Church's firm resolve to continue its parochial school system. In view
of the enormous cost, discontinuance might be a reasonable alternative
if parochial schools provided merely a more intensified religious
instruction than would be provided through other, existing Church
programs. If, however, the consequence of discontinuance would be the
inculcation of irreligion through the public school curriculum, the
church schools must be maintained regardless of cost.
If a prohibition upon state aid to parochial schools is based upon
the value of diluting religious belief, the no-aid doctrine can in no
sense be characterized as a derivative of a neutral separation principle;
rather, it imposes an obligation of hostility to religion. If such a con-
stitutional obligation were incorporated in the establishment clause,
government could not aid parochial schools--but neither should it
allow them to exist. And certainly it could prohibit their existence. But
Pierce v. Society of Sisters1 23 affirms their right to exist. Indeed, if the
value served by the denial of aid is the dilution of religion, then denial
is for the purpose of opposing religion and is itself an imposition. So
considered, denial of aid becomes an establishment violation.'2 4
Therefore, even accepting the approach that since religion is a danger
government may not render aid which increases that danger, that value
is afforded maximum protection by a no-imposition standard. A stan-
dard of no-aid affords no greater protection and is more consistent with
hostility than neutrality.
122. Justice Frankfurter's secular unity principle may be a tactful expression of thls
position; although, like the values purportedly promoted by secular unity, dilution of
religious belief might be better accomplished by aid rather than no aid. A public tchool
released time program, for instance, by attracting children away from parochial schools,
may better serve to dilute their religious belief than an exdusively secular public school
program which has the effect of maximizing Catholic attendance at parochial schools,
See pp. 717-19 supra.
123. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
124. "We agree of course that the State may not establish a 'religion of secularism, in
the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus 'preferring those
who believe in no religion over those who do believe.'" Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963). See also pp. 700-01 supra.
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C. Content and Applications of a No-Imposition Standard
1. Imposition Distinguished from Implementation
A no-imposition standard assumes that the principal purpose of the
establishment clause is to guarantee to an individual adult maximum
freedom in the determination of his religious or irreligious beliefs,
and to protect the primacy of the parents in the determination of their
children's religious or irreligious beliefs. Other purposes may be to
guarantee governmental neutrality in the institutional battle for ad-
herents and to prohibit aid which increases the dangers of religion to
the rights of nonbelievers or other-believers. All of these purposes are
accomplished by a standard which does no more than prohibit govern-
ment from compelling or influencing religious choice and from aiding
others to influence religious choice.
In some respects a no-imposition standard produces results under the
establishment clause which overlap with results reached through ap-
plication of the free exercise clause. Thus, a statute forbidding Baptist
church services would prohibit free exercise and would also influence
religious choice. In other respects the overlap is questionable. Com-
pelling a Baptist to attend Seventh-day Adventist services, but allowing
him to attend his own, is certainly an act influencing religious choice
but-assuming that Baptist dogma allows its membership to attend
the services of another sect-may not be a prohibition of free exercise.
In still other respects there is no overlap at all. State sponsorship of
prayer for those schoolchildren who wish to pray is not a prohibition
of the free exercise rights of nonparticipating schoolchildren 1' but
does influence their religious choice. A no-imposition standard makes
it unnecessary to decide whether particular state action constitutes
coercion. Compelling religious participation is certainly an imposition,
but so is persuasion, endorsement or any other means of influencing
choice.126
125. Engel v. Vitale, 870 U.S. 421, 430 (1962); Abington School Dist. v. Sdiempp, 374
U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
126. Professor Brown points out that both the free exercise and establishment clauses
are applicable to the states only insofar as their violation constitutes a depri%2tion of
life, liberty or property under the fourteenth amendment. Brown, supra note 85, at 25.
It is therefore illogical to hold that a voluntary prayer program is not a violation of the
free exercise clause because it does not involve coercion but is a violation of the estab.
lishment clause which does not require coercion; if influence does not constitute a
deprivation of religious liberty, in logic it cannot constitute a deprivation of whatever
liberty is protected by the establishment clause. A better means of resolving the problem
is to hold that influence is a deprivation of liberty in both situations, but that free
exercise only protects the liberty to exercise ones own religion; it does not protect against
influence or compulsion subjecting one to the teachings of another religion when that
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To be distinguished from imposition is state action which does not
influence choice but helps implement a religious or irreligious choice
independently made. In rendering such aid the state is expressing a
judgment that religion is a worthy activity, and it may be argued that
in recognizing worthiness, the state is by design or otherwise encourag-
ing belief and hence influencing religious choice. As a practical matter,
however, recognition of worth will not have a substantial imposition
effect and will have no effect at all where the religion aided is a
minority sect. Exemption of Mrs. Sherbert from South Carolina's
unemployment compensation requirement represents a judgment that
the exercise of Seventh-day Adventism is more worthy than bowling on
Saturdays, but the exemption has no significant effect and arguably no
effect at all upon whether someone becomes a Seventh-day Adventist.
Similarly, the Sabbatarian exemption from Sunday closing laws does
not induce one to become a Jew; draft exemption to conscientious
objectors does not normally induce one to become a Quaker; closing
the public schools on all religious holidays or on every Wednesday at
2 P.M. does not induce the adoption of religion; and compulsory Sun-
day dosing, while implementing an independent desire to attend
church services, has no substantial effect upon the creation of such
desire. The availability of preferential aid to religious exercise may,
to be sure, induce false claims of religious belief, but the establishment
clause is not concerned with false claims of belief, only with induced
belief.127
Some aids to religion, whether preferential or nonpreferential, may
have the effect of intensifying an independently made religious belief.
While a parochial school bus subsidy does not induce adoption of
Catholicism, it may result in a more intense belief. But, as already
noted, action which has the effect of intensifying belief is qualitatively
different from action which induces belief; the former supplements
while the latter contradicts the establishment values of individual and
family determination of religious choice. Perfect neutrality is impos-
sible: implementation of a desire to attend parochial school may in-
tensify belief, but failure to implement defeats religious choice; and
since freedom of religious choice, not neutrality per se, is the funda-
mental establishment value, the neutrality tool is useful only insofar
as it promotes that choice.
is not forbidden by the body of dogma of one's own religion. The latter is an Individual,
parental and institutional liberty distinct from free exercise and it is that distinct liberty
which is protected by the establishment clause.
127. Cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
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2. Imposition and Balancing
Government implementation of one individual's religious choice
may result in the imposition of religion upon another. That was the
relationship involved in the released time, and Bible and prayer read-
ing cases. 8 To the extent that the children involved, or their parents,
desired religious instruction, there was merely implementation of an
independently made religious choice. That implementation, however,
may have had an imposition effect on those children whose parents
did not desire instruction. For these purposes, it is not necessary to
decide whether the Court's psychological conclusions as to factors which
influence children were correct, or whether the psychological con-
clusions of McCollum are consistent with those of Zorach. The im-
portant point is that all four decisions are primarily concerned with
whether the practices in question would have an imposition effect.
Thus, significantly, Justice Douglas said in Zorach that the state could
"encourage," "accommodate," or "cooperate" with religious exercise,
but could not "persuade or force," that is, could not impose religion.120,
These decisions make clear that implementation and imposition effects
are not to be balanced. Religion in the classroom-whether by way of
instruction or observance-may fairly be said to advance or implement
the majority's free exercise. At the same time, perhaps only a few
children were subjected to a threat of religious imposition. A balancing
standard, therefore, would have yielded different results in Abington,
Engel and McCollum. But the Court evidently considered that the
balance would have been between the majority's worthy but non-
constitutional religious interest and the minority's constitutional right.
A much more difficult problem would arise if the majority could
not possibly exercise its religion without an imposition of that religion
upon the minority. In that event a true collision between constitu-
tional imperatives would occur and subordination of one claim to the
other would obviously be required. Should such a situation exist it is
far from certain that the establishment clause would be the one sub-
ordinated. In fact, however, if the establishment clause is read to pro-
hibit only an imposition of religion, the likelihood of any collision
between free exercise and establishment is substantially reduced and
the subordination problem becomes largely theoretical. The instances
cited by Justice Brennan, for example, as representing a subordination
128. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 US. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1952); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); nlinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1947).
129. 343 US. at 311, 314.
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of establishment to exercise,180 are situations where there has been no
imposition, and hence no establishment violation to be subordinated.
An imposition standard also better explains situations where an aid
to religion is purportedly balanced against advancement of a state
secular interest. Since Everson and McGowan,181 which involve this
approach, do not identify the evil associated with aid they make in-
telligent balancing impossible. If the evil is identified as imposition,
however, these cases become manageable. Implementation of indepen-
dent decisions to attend parochial school or Sunday church services does
not result in any imposition of religion. Since they are not impositions,
they do not raise any establishment question and no balancing is re-
quired.
Chief Justice Warren in McGowan almost sees this. After seeking
to demonstrate that Sunday closing is secularly motivated, he dis-
tinguishes McCollum: "[N]o such coercion to attend church services
is present in the situation at bar . . . the alternatives open to non.
laboring persons in the instant case are far more diverse." 182 In thus
distinguishing McCollum, the Court's opinion seems to suggest that
even if the state's motivation is secular, a regulation which has the
effect of compelling or influencing religious choice is suspect. In other
words, a secular motive does not necessarily justify an imposition effect.
But if the establishment violation consists of an imposition effect, what
relevance does that clause have to a situation where there is no imposi-
tion, whether the state's motive be secular or religious? Conversely,
where imposition results, only a compelling secular purpose which
may not otherwise be accomplished would over-balance the prima facie
establishment violation.
3. Imposition by Government Distinguished from Indirect Aid to
Private Proselytization
Under a no-imposition standard, aid which implements religious
exercise without inducing religious belief is lawful. Conversely, any
direct government imposition of religion, whether the motivation be
secular or religious, is unlawful. Situations in both of these categories
may be resolved without use of any balancing technique. There is,
however, a third category: government aid, designed to serve a secular
130. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299 (1963) (concurring opinion of
Brennan, J.); see p. 707 supra.
131. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961).
132. 366 U.S. at 451.
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interest or to implement religious exercise, which has as an indirect
effect the advancement of private proselytizing efforts; and situations
arising therein require a balancing standard.
There is a difference between imposition by government and govern-
ment aid to private proselytization which justifies a per se rule in the
former case and a balancing approach in the latter. Direct government
imposition is much more effective than private proselytization, and
hence much more to be feared and guarded against. The state's tradi-
tional role is not that of an interested advocate, frankly attempting to
persuade, but of an arbiter of truth. The nonbeliever or other-believer
is therefore much more subject to imposition by governmental ad-
vocacy, unavoidably disguised as objective truth, than by the blandish-
ments and imprecations of a private institution. Justice Brennan offers
an analogous distinction as a means of reconciling McCollum and
Zorach:
The deeper difference was that the McCollum program placed
the religious instructor in the public school classroom in precisely
the position of authority held by the regular teachers of secular
subjects, which the Zorach program did not. The McCollum pro-
gram, in lending to the support of sectarian instruction all the
authority of the governmentally operated public school system,
brought government and religion into that proximity which the
Establishment Clause forbids. To be sure, a religious teacher
presumably commands substantial respect and merits attention
in his own right. But the Constitution does not permit that pres-
tige and capacity for influence to be augmented by investiture of
.all the symbols of authority at the command of the lay teacher for
the enhancement of secular instruction.13
That is, in McCollum the state associated itself with the religious in-
struction program sufficiently to assume a proselytizing role whereas in
Zorach the absence of such association resulted in a characterization of
the program as one of state aid to private religious instruction rather
than imposition by government.
A striking illustration of the distinction between imposition by
government and aid to private proselytization is afforded by a com-
parison of Fowler v. Rhode Island 34 and McCollum. In Fowler the
municipality was not only permitted but required to allow Jehovah's
Witnesses use of park facilities to spread their gospel, while in Mc-
Collum the use of school facilities for religious instruction purposes
133. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 262-63 (1963) (concurring opinion).
134. 45 US. 67 (1952).
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was held unconstitutional. In both cases aid limited to use of public
facilities would have been lawful, especially in McCollum since the
religious groups there did not intend to proselytize but only to offer
religious instruction to their own members. In McCollum, however,
the state associated itself with the program and thereby influenced
attendance, while in Fowler the unrestricted range of choices available,
the lack of peer pressure and the absence of any aura of state authority
precluded the possibility that the state itself was influencing religious
choice. 135 This is not to say that aid to private proselytization is a proper
purpose. On the contrary, it is never a proper purpose and always
creates a prima facie establishment violation, but that violation may
sometimes be overcome by a secular purpose, or by a free exercise or
equality right, or by a free exercise claim other than the institution's
interest in proselytizing. 3 It is interesting to compare McCollum and
Fowler with the practice of allowing religious institutions to instruct
their members in public buildings, after hours. In McCollum there
was state imposition-hence an absolute standard is employed; in
Fowler there was state aid to private proselytization-hence the imposi-
tion effect of the aid is balanced against a countervailing interest,
specifically, in Fowler, a free exercise and equal protection right.
Where, on the other hand, public facilities are used for a nonprosely-
tizing religious purpose and there is no danger of an unintended im-
position effect, there is not even a prima facie violation-hence there
is no need to find a countervailing interest justifying the aid.
The distinction sometimes made betwen aid to the institution
and aid to the individua' 8 7 often produces results consistent with
those obtained pursuant to a no-imposition standard. This occurs
primarily because many of the benefits conferred upon individuals on
the basis of their religious beliefs are in the form of exemptions from
regulatory laws, which are unlikely to present imposition dangers, and
because individuals-as individuals--are usually not in the business
of proselytizing and hence are not likely to devote the aid they receive
135. The same distinction reconciles McCollum with Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S.
573 (1944), and Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). Cf. Kurland, supra note 7,
at 48-49.
136. Justice Reed, speaking for the Court in Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942),
rev'd on rehearing, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) (per curiam), held that tax exemption for prosely.
tizing activities was not constitutionally compelled but indicated that such an exemption
would be a permissible exercise of legislative discretion. Id. at 598. This seems to mean
that the constitutional evil may be overcome by a purpose to effect that evil. To that
extent, the case is inconsistent with a no.imposition standard.
137. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 302-03 (1963) (concurring opinion
of Brennan, J.); Cushman, Public Support oi Religious Education in American Constitu.
tional Law, 45 ILL. L. REv. 333, 337-49 (1950).
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directly to a proselytizing use. The distinction, however, has no intrinsic
merit; it will achieve correct results only insofar as its applications
fortuitously coincide with those reached pursuant to a no-imposition
standard. Thus a state grant to individuals who regularly attend church
is clearly an imposition of religion and would probably be universally
considered an establishment violation, yet it is an aid to an individual,
not to an institution.
Conversely, many grants to religious institutions would not present
any immediate imposition danger. For instance, state subsidy of
parochial school textbook purchases, whether secular or religious
books, 138 would not impose religion on the parochial school child. The
only immediate effect would be to implement a private desire to
obtain a religious education. The difficulty is that an indirect effect
of institutional aid which has financial value may be the imposition of
religion, since funds freed by the aid may be diverted to a proselytizing
use.139 But such diversion is a possible, if more remote, result of
financially significant aid to the individual. Consequently, the institu-
tion-individual distinction at best serves only as a rule of thumb
indicating the likelihood of diversion into a proselytizing use and adds
nothing but obfuscation to a no-imposition standard.
Justice Douglas, concurring in Abington, identifies imposition as
the evil of aid. Moreover, he sees no constitutional distinction between
"the State itself . . . conducting religious exercises" (imposition by
government) and aid, direct or indirect, in large or small amounts, to
the proselytizing efforts of private institutions.14 0 As already noted,
there is a significant difference in imposition effect as between govern-
ment imposition and aid to the proselytizing function, although that
difference does not automatically create a constitutional distinction.
But, if no such distinction is made, how is fire or police protection
justified? Both have financial value and hence may be said to constitute
indirect aid to proselytizing efforts of private institutions. They are
not necessarily justified by a transcendent equality value. As we have
noted,'14 equality must at times be subordinated to establishment in
order to avoid direct and substantial imposition effects. Obeisance to
158. It has been suggested that aid to parochial schools is unconstitutional because
those schools make religious use of even secular materials. Gordon, supra note 70, at 90.
But religious use for those who wish religious use is not antithetical to any constitutional
value.
159. CHPISMNrr TODAY, Mar. 17, 1967, at 41; see Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 27,
1966, at 1, col. 3.
140. 374 US. at 229-30.
141. See pp. 698-99 supra.
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equality compels disregard for the difference between aid which pre-
sents a likelihood of a substantial imposition effect and aid which
presents at most a minimal possibility of a marginal imposition effect;
and yet the greater and more likely the effect, the greater the danger the
establishment clause is intended to prevent. Therefore, notwithstand-
ing Justice Douglas' view that an establishment is an establishment, it
is necessary to include within a no-imposition standard a distinction
between government imposition and government aid to religious in-
stitutions not intended to further their imposition efforts but which
may be diverted to that purpose. The constitutionality of aid which
falls within this latter category must be determined by balancing,
Recognition that no imposition is the establishment value, however,
allows a more structured application of that inherently uncertain
methodology. Although it contributes no new insight into those factors
(state secular interest, equality value and free exercise right or claim)
which may serve to overcome a prima facie violation, it identifies the
nature of that violation and thereby allows for assessments and grada-
tions of the degree of permissible danger.
A number of factors are relevant to an assessment of the imposition
danger.
The first and most important is the extent to which the aid will
directly serve a proselytizing use. For instance, employment of religious
institutions as instrumentalities or conduits of public welfare pro-
grams142 will result in direct aid to their proselytizing function.
Proselytization in such situations is not a possible, indirect result
brought about by diversion of funds but the probable, perhaps in.
evitable, consequence of their intended use. A church will more
effectively influence religious choice by administering poverty funds
than by a millenium of conventional evangelism with exclusively "re-
ligious" materials. 148 Most obviously, responsibility for the administra-
142. Religious and religious-affiliated organizations participate in an enormous number
of such federal programs. See, e.g., Housing: (a) Housing Act of 1959, § 202, 73 Stat. 667,
as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1710 (Supp. I, 1965); (b) National Housing Act, § 221(d)(8), 75
Stat. 149, as amended, 12 U..C. § 1715(l) (Supp. I, 1965) (c) 12 U.S.C. 1701(s); d)
Housing Act of 1961, § 207, 75 Stat. 165, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1713 (Supp. I, 1965),
Child Welfare: Social Security Act, tit. V, 42 U.S.C. §§ 701-31 (maternal cild health
and crippled children's services); Juvenile Delinquency: 42 U.S.C. § 2541; Economic
Opportunity: (a) Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, tit. II, 78 Stat. 516, as amended, 42
US.C. §§ 2782 et seq. (Supp. I, 1965) (community action); (b) id. tit. II, pt. B, 78 Stat.
520, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2802 et seq. (Supp. I, 1965) (adult basic education); (c) id.
tit. I, pt. B, 78 Stat. 512, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2734-35 (Supp. I, 1965) (work training
program). For a compendium of programs in which church groups participate, see Hear.
ings, supra note 20, at 12-22.
143. See note 20 supra.
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tion of poverty funds will enable a church to reach a vast audience
otherwise unreceptive to its teachings. A few churches will consciously
seek to gain new members from that audience, and though most
churches will not, some of their individual clergymen will. More
significantly, participation will gain for the church an image of
"relevance" which in turn will attract members.144 And, most signi-
ficantly, independently of any policy of gaining members, most clergy-
men-administrators believe that those in their charge have spiritual as
well as material needs and that failure to satisfy all of those needs is a
disservice to the poor. It is theoretically possible to separate material
from spiritual service, but that separation is unnatural and requires
constant discipline of which few are capable. The clergymen-adminis-
trators who fail to maintain that separation are not malevolent evangel-
ists: they are merely well-intentioned human beings unable to perform
an unnatural, but constitutionally required duty.
A second relevant factor is the extent to which aid to the proselytizing
function, or aid which may be converted into a proselytizing use, may
at least theoretically be shared equally by all religious and irreligious
groups. An exemption for religious proselytizers from a street vending
tax obviously aids the Jehovah's Witness Church more than the
Catholic Church, but that inequality of benefit results from the differ-
ent proselytizing techniques those churches have chosen to adopt.
Every group could, if they chose, benefit equally from the exemption.
A property tax exemption, on the other hand, frees more money for
proselytizing use to the wealthy church than to the poorer ones, and
that discrimination is not a product of choice. An exemption limited
to $5,000 of church property would obviously be less discriminatory.
A third factor is the likelihood that aid to a nonproselytizing use
will be converted into a proselytizing use and the magnitude of the
funds involved. A requirement that the funds granted not be used for
proselytization is obviously insufficient. A requirement that the total
amount of annual church appropriations for proselytization not be
increased would be impossible to administer and constitutionally
defective. The only test, and a difficult one to apply, which would
sometimes be practicable is whether the activity aided was one which
144. See remarks of Senator Charles Percy, reported in Wall Street Journal, July SI,
1967, at 9, col. 1: "The church which remains aloof [from social welfare programs] ...
will remain irrelevant to millions of Americans, and especially to young Americans".
N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1968, at 48, col. 8 (report that the failure of Orthodox Judaism to
become involved in such social issues as poverty has disenchanted some of the most
devout members).
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the religious institution was already paying for or was likely to pay for.
If, for instance, parochial school children had always themselves paid
for their lunches or books, a grant to the institution or the children
for those purposes would be less likely to create funds for proselytizing.
A grant or loan of a cyclotron to a small denominational college is a
clearer case. In considering the magnitude of freed funds, a de minimis
concept is obviously called for. One hundred or one thousand dollars
will have no meaningful imposition effect.
Applying a balancing standard to grants to religious institutions for
public welfare purposes, we thus suggest three factors which point
toward an imposition danger: (1) most significantly, a direct aid to
a proselytizing function, (2) a variety of aid which many, perhaps most,
sects are not economically or organizationally able to participate in,
and (3) aid of substantial dollar magnitude which may facilitate
diversion of funds for additional proselytizing use. Conversely, the only
factor to be balanced against the substantial imposition danger is that
some religious institutions are effective administrators of such pro-
grams. Neither the equality value nor any free exercise claim or right
is defeated by denying church participation.145 Therefore, unless
church participation is vital to the success of public welfare programs-
because private secular institutions are not equipped to administer
them and because there is a compelling need for private rather than
public administration-that participation would seem to be violative
of the establishment clause.
The case for aid to parochial schools, under a balancing standard
which identifies imposition as the establishment danger, is much
stronger. Most importantly, parochial school aid does not directly
serve a proselytizing function; for the most part, only existing
Catholics who wish a religious education are directly affected. The
imposition effect, if any, will only result from the possible diversion of
funds for a proselytizing use,146 and it is not at all clear that such
diversions will occur. If parochial school facilities are as deficient as
alleged, it is not likely that a government subsidy will result in a
diminution of institutional appropriations to education. Failure to
145. See pp. 698-99 supra.
146. Such being the case, it should not make any difference whether the aid is granted
to parochial grade schools or universities. The only circumstance which would justify
that distinction is the possibility that intensified belief increases the danger of Cathol.
icism to non-Catholics. If such were the case, it would be arguable that a university
religious education is qualitatively less dangerous than a grade school religious education,
The evidence, however, indicates that intensified belief does not increase the danger of
religion. See pp. 724-26 supra.
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subsidize might ultimately result in an increase in the percentage of
church funds used for education, thereby curtailing funds available for
proselytization, but it is also possible that failure to subsidize will make
parochial education an impossible financial burden,14 7 thereby freeing
education funds for proselytizing use. Consequently, while it is true
that Catholic schools will benefit far more than other religious schools
from an education subsidy, and that the sums involved are very sub-
stantial, the likelihood of a significant imposition effect resulting from
a subsidy is at best speculative. Offsetting this speculative danger is the
obvious state interest in quality education for all children and the
parochial school child's equality, free exercise and establishment
claims.148 Therefore, it would appear that a no-imposition standard
would validate a parochial school subsidy, and that result is clearly
indicated if we may use as a touchstone practices, such as tax exemp-
tion, which pose much graver imposition dangers 49 and yet have been
held constitutional. 50
147. CimlsriAxrry TODAY, Afar. 31, 1967, at 39; N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1967, § 1, at 75,
col. 2. See also id., Sept. 20, 1967, § 1, at 34, col. 6; id., Jan. 11, 1967, § 1, at 37, col. 2.
148. See pp. 699-701 supra. As stated in note 138 supra, there is no greater imposition
danger from a subsidy for religious books than from a subsidy for secular books. It may
be, however, that there is a distinction in that failure to subsidize religious books does
not frustrate any state secular interest or the religious child's equality and establishment
claims. Thus, in such a case, only the child's free exercise claim is properly to be balanced
against the speculative, indirect imposition danger.
149. In tax exemption there is no similarity in benefit, the wealthier churches in
effect receiving more money, the funds involved are unrestricted in use and consequently
may be directly used for proselytizing, and the amount of money involved may be sub.
stantial. At the same time no secular purpose is necessarily served since there is no
restriction on the use to which the funds may be put and refusal to grant the exemption
would not deprive religious individuals of any equality claim. Thus, at best, only a
marginal free exercise claim may be balanced against the substantial imposition danger.
150. See Murray v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 241 Md. 383, 216 A.2d 897, cert.
denied, 385 US. 816 (1966).
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